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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports on the behavior of markets in which all agents have identical costs 
with economies of scale over the entire range of demand. Each firm, by choosing a larger 
scale of plant and a larger volume, can experience lower average cost. Thus the markets 
are characterized by the fundamental technological property that has motivated decades 
of theorizing about natural monopoly and imperfect competition. The primary question 
posed by the research is whether or not a natural monopoly emerges and sets prices at 
monopoly levels or whether the data are more closely approximated by some alternative 
model of imperfect competition such as monopolistic competition, Cournot oligopoly or 
contestable market theory. The results are that monopoly emerges and charges prices 
closely approximated by contestable market theory. No support is found for Cournot 
forms of oligopoly or for other types of monopolistic competition. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper reports on the behavior of markets in which all agents have identical costs 
with economies of scale over the entire range of demand. Each firm, by choosing a larger 
scale of plant and a larger volume, can experience lower average cost. Thus the markets 
are characterized by the fundamental technological property that has motivated decades 
of theorizing about natural monopoly and imperfect competition. The primary question 
posed by the research is whether or not a natural monopoly emerges and sets prices at 
monopoly levels or whether the data are more closely approximated by some alternative 
model of imperfect competition such as monopolistic competition, Cournot oligopoly or 
contestable market theory. 
Some of the principle results of the experiments reported here can, in retrospect, 
be interpreted as having been anticipated by the pathbreaking work of Coursey, Isaac, 
and Smith (1984), and by Coursey, Isaac, Luke and Smith (1984). While these previous 
experiments involved economic environments that were much less complicated than the 
one studied here, the tendencies previously observed are clearly present in the behaviors 
reported here. So, in a sense, the results reported here can be interpreted as a maJor 
extension of the previous results as well as replication, and robustness check. 
The similarities of experimental design with previous experiments rest on the facts 
of falling average cost and no barriers to entry that existed in all experiments. However, 
the number and nature of departures from the previous research are substantial. The 
markets studied here were much larger so parameters took values in a more continuous 
manner. The experiments studied here involved two markets so entry into the falling 
1This paper began with a project in an experimental economics class at Caltech in which G. Elbaz 
and A. Sugiyama were undergraduate students. In addition to the authors, Peter Ying contributed to 
the project during the initial stages ofresearch. The comments of William Novshek are also appreciated. 
The financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental 
Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. 
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average cost market was accompanied by the opportunity cost of profits foregone in the 
alternative market. The alternative market was a computerized double auction which 
agents generally enjoy so entry into the falling average cost market did not result from 
an attempt to relieve boredom which one might have suspected played a role in previous 
studies. Agents entering the falling average cost market were required to make a choice 
of scale of plant that affected costs. Thus the theory of cost minimization played an 
active role in developing models. This dimension was completely absent from previous 
experiments. Previous experiments used linear average costs that fell with volume until 
a capacity constraint was reached (within the range of demand) and then costs became 
vertical. Average costs in the experiments reported here were nonlinear and fell through­
out the range of demand. In addition, the nonlinearities, scale economies and demand 
were configured to create Cournot equilibria in the appropriate Cournot model of the 
environment. The Cournot equilibria were separated from the competitive (price equals 
average cost plus opportunity cost) equilibrium. In previous experiments the Cournot 
equilibrium was also the competitive equilibrium. The number of potential entrants used 
in previous experiments was small, ranging from two to four. In the experiments reported 
here there were seven potential competitors. Briefly put, the choice of parameters for the 
experiments reported here was such that the economic environment was similar to those 
commonly found in the figures in economics textbooks. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT, DESIGN AND P ROCEDURES
A total of three experiments were conducted. Subjects were students at the California 
Institute of Technology and summer interns at Caltech. Some of the subjects were expe­
rienced in the operation of electronic markets. As it turns out, the empirical tendencies 
that were observed in the experiments are so pronounced that only three experiments 
appear to be needed to answer the original question posed. Since the experiments are 
expensive in terms of time and money, a decision was made to limit the number of ex­
periments to three. Given the behavior exhibited by the twenty one people studied, the 
expectation that anything would be learned from additional replications seems too low 
to justify the cost. 
Each experiment consisted of 7 buyers and 7 sellers. Subjects with experience were 
placed in the more complex roll of sellers. Two markets were created. They will be called 
market A and market B .  The buyers could participate in both. Sellers could participate 
in either but not in both. In market A sellers had identical cost functions designed such 
that they were guaranteed a rent from participating in the market. The parameters were 
chosen such that in market A the rents per seller and the market price were (theoretically) 
independent of the number of sellers that chose to sell in that market. Market A was 
organized by a (computerized) double auction that fully occupied the attention of the 
sellers that chose to function in that market so they would not be motivated by boredom 
to enter market B. 
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Market B was different. Sellers that chose to operate in market B made irrevocable 
decisions about scale of plant, the quantity that they would offer for sale and the price 
they would post. Thus the market organization was the standard posted price environ­
ment in which commitments were private information until the market opened. The only 
difference was that a seller could choose to drop out of the market once the decisions of 
other sellers were public but before the market opened. The decisions to drop out were 
also private (revealed simultaneously) and irrevocable. The dropout decision served to 
limit losses to the opportunity cost of market A profits foregone, and reduced the prob­
ability that subject bankruptcies would disrupt the experiment. In market B all sellers 
had the same cost function. The cost function was characterized by economies of scale. 
In summary, the economic environment had the following properties. 
1. Participation in market B involved an opportunity cost because reasonably pre­
dictable rents could be gained from participation in market A.
2. Participation in market A was "fun" in the sense that many people enjoy the speed
and activity of the computerized double auction.
3. Participation in market B could be done without exposure to a major out-of-pocket
loss due to volume being less than was anticipated at the time of the choice of scale
of plant.
4. All transactions took place in a currency called francs. Each franc was converted
to dollars at a rate of .0075 for buyers and .006 for sellers.
A. The Market Environment 
A continuous approximation of market demands for markets A and B are contained 
in Figures lA and lB. The equation for the continuous approximation of the market 
demand in market B is 
P = 1 1 10 - 25x ( 1 )  
Individual parameters for the demanders are in Tables 1 and 2. Each of seven demanders 
made money by participating in market A and in market B. Each buyer had the same 
redemption values in market A each period. That is, in market A both the market 
demand and the individual redemption values were constant over periods. In market B, 
the market demand was constant over periods but the redemption value of each individual 
changed from period to period. A fixed family of schedules found in Table 2 was rotated 
among the individual demanders. The rotation of schedules among demanders is shown 
for each period in Appendix A. The rotation convention was used because uncertainty 
about which model might be most accurate gave us little confidence in our ability to 
predict incomes of buyers. We wanted the income of all subject buyers to be sufficiently 
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high to keep their interests. The rotation had a useful feature of removing dramatic 
asymmetries. 
Each of seven sellers had identical costs throughout the experiment. The fact that 
the costs were identical was not known by any agent in the markets. Each had the 
option of participating in either market A or in market B but not in both. A seller that 
participated in market A used the cost schedule in Table 1. For a single seller the graph 
of the (marginal) costs are included in Figure lA. As can be seen, the seller had two low 
cost units and then had constant cost afterwards for enough units to satisfy the entire 
demand. 
Given these individual costs in market A, the market price (according to the com­
petitive model) will be constant at 700 at all volumes near the demand (at 21  units) 
regardless of the number of suppliers in market A. As will be stated more clearly below, 
the equilibrium price will be near 700 and rents for all sellers in market A will be about 
300 (2 units at 150 = 700 - 550 each) regardless of the number of other sellers in market 
A as long as there are at least two. 2
The costs of all seven suppliers were the same for market B. Each subject had separate 
tables (in different colors) for marginal cost, average cost and total cost. The total cost 
table is shown as Table 3. As can be seen, costs depended upon both scale of plant and 
volume of sales. The other tables are included with the instructions in Appendix B. 
A continuous approximation to the underlying discrete parameter cost function has 
been useful in the development of behavioral predictions as well as experimental design 
decisions. F igure 2 contains a graph of the long-run average cost curve in this continuous 
model, and also the short-run average costs for selected scales of plant. A continuous 
approximation of the market demand curve is imposed over the average cost for compar­
ison. 
The formula for the competitive model is as follows. The model is restricted to the 
values of parameters in the range of the tables of costs. The model begins with short­
run average cost (SRAC) which depends upon output and the scale of plant (x, s). In 
the discrete values of costs in the table the scale of plant is indicated by letters of the 
alphabet starting with the letter A. In the continuous model if scale is A then s = 1 1; if 
scale is B then s = 12, etc., with a change of one in s as the letters change. 
3 1 SRAC(x,s) = 4(x- s)
2 + 4(s -40)
2 + 300. (2) 
2Typically two or three sellers are enough for competitive equilibrium behavior in a double auction 
market. 
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The optimum scale of plant given a quantity xis indicated by s* (x). The formula is
3 
s*(x) = 10 + 4x. 
Substituting (3) into (2), the long-run average cost function, LRAC(x) is obtained.
3 LRAC (x) = SRAC(x,s*(x)) = 600 - 15x + 16x
2
•
(3) 
(4) 
Of course this yields the long-run total cost (LRTC) and the long-run marginal cost
(LRMC) as follows.
LRTC (x) 
LRMC(x) 
3 600x - 15x2 + 16  x
3
= 8LRTC(x) = 600 _ 30 � 2 ox x+l6x .
(5) 
(6) 
The continuous model will be very useful to the interested reader. The complicated 
calculations for the equilibria of various models were first done in the context of the 
continuous model. The location of the equilibria in models based on discrete parameters 
was always nearby. 
B. Market Organization 
Market A was a computerized double auction. Market B was a posted price market. 
Both markets opened at the same time for trading. Sellers were informed about the 
market demand function in market B but they knew nothing about the market demand 
function in market A. Since market A followed standard procedures for MUDA markets,3 
only the timing and the details of market B need to be reviewed. 
Before each period all seller agents were required to decide which m.arket they would 
enter. After deciding they (privately) drew a large X through the record sheet of the
market not chosen. Agents choosing market B would then fill in the blanks on their 
record for the period committing themselves to a scale of plant, a quantity to be offered 
and a price. The computerized MUDA program allows the simultaneous operation of 
3See Plott and Gray (1990) for a detailed description of this market, or see Plott (1991) for a 
description of the computerized version. 
5 
multiple markets. Each of the seven sellers was assigned to a "personal market" in which 
no other seller could participate. The sellers would enter their (price, quantity) pairs in
an order box fixed on their individual markets. At the appropriate (public) signal each
seller would press the enter key thereby making their private decisions public to all buyers 
and sellers as they were displayed by the computer as asks (to sell) in their individual
markets. Once sellers had seen the asks of other sellers, they had the opportunity to 
cancel their own asks. This was done simultaneously on signal. Sellers canceling asks 
were not permitted to enter the A market. They did nothing for the remainder of the 
period. Thus sellers who entered market B and canceled experienced the opportunity 
cost of A profits. 
After sellers who had made the decision to enter market B had the opportunity to 
cancel, all markets opened for trading. Market A proceeded along the standard lines for 
the computerized MUDA. In market B, sellers who remained each had a price posted and 
a maximum quantity. At any time during a period buyers could toggle to any of these 
markets and purchase the number of units desired at the posted price up to the amount 
for sale that the seller had left. Buyers could only accept the asks in these markets. That 
is, they could not tender bids in any market except market A. 
A comment about the organization is in order. Market A was a double auction and 
it existed as a source of income and entertainment for those who chose not to enter 
market B. Market B was a posted price market because it is thought to provide the 
best circumstances for monopoly behavior (Smith, 1981). When the demand function is
known and prices are posted, the seller is most likely to successfully charge monopoly 
prices. Double auctions are known to have strong tendencies to converge to a competitive 
equilibrium even in the presence of monopoly. If market B had been a double auction 
then any tendency to converge to a competitive equilibrium could have been attributed 
to the market micro structure alone, as opposed to the industrial organization. Thus 
the posted price institution was thought to be a more favorable environment for the 
emergence of monopoly pricing than the double auction. 
The cancellation property is important as a risk reduction feature in this type of 
market. If a seller chooses a large scale of plant and succeeds in selling only a few units, 
large losses can be experienced. Buyers have the capacity to punish high-priced sellers 
by purchasing only a unit or two. Similarly well meaning buyers who want to share the 
volume by spreading .purchases over sellers can be very costly to .a seller who does not 
otherwise get the volume. Likewise, accidental purchases can be very costly. Cancellation 
allows those sellers who choose relatively high prices the opportunity to avoid such risks. 
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The experiment contained one other special feature. A market demand function for 
market B was privately distributed to the sellers on a sheet of paper. All sellers knew 
what it meant. The demand function given sellers was actually 10  francs below the 
actual induced values. Buyers typically do not trade without a small profit margin for 
themselves. We believed that the function we gave them was a better model of what 
they would experience than would be the actual limit values. 
C. Procedures 
The experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and 
Political Science at Caltech. Subjects consisted of undergraduates, graduate students at 
the California Institute of Technology, plus high school students who were attending a 
special summer program. Most had previous experience in some type of computerized 
market. All had paged through a computerized instruction routine that familiarized them 
with key functions and the mechanics of making bids, offers and acceptances. 
In addition to the three experiments reported here, pilot experiments were conducted. 
The pilot experiments were discarded because they typically involved choices of parame­
ters that were based on a miscalculation of the theoretical models. The parameters and 
procedures of one experiment were exactly like those reported in this paper but the data 
are not reported because one subject evidenced substantial confusion. The results of 
these unreported experiments appeared qualitatively similar to the experiments that are 
reported here. Space constraints effectively preclude their publication. Should anyone 
want to study them in detail, the data will be made available upon request. 
Experimental sessions which lasted on the order of three hours began in the evening 
at about 7:00 P.M. The detailed instructions that were read to the subjects are contained 
in the Appendix. In addition, the material presented on the chalkboard and the step­
by-step procedures for conducting the experiment are also in the Appendix. 
The highlights of these experimental procedures are as follows. Subjects were paid 
a "show up" fee of $5.00 if they were extras and were turned away from participation. 
Subjects agreed to work off any losses incurred during the experiment at a rate of $10.00 
per hour. Of course buyers could make no losses unless they resulted from some sort of 
(foolish) speculation or from a typo. Contracts involving obvious typos that would result 
in large losses were always voided by the experimenter (a standard .practice). However, 
sellers could make a loss. If a seller entered the B market at a substantial scale of plant
and sold only a small number of units the losses could be considerable. 
Sellers who wanted a sure return could participate in the A market. The design of 
this market was such that a rent of $1.80 per period was almost certain for participation 
in market A and the seller was exposed to no possibility of a loss. On average each 
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participant made approximately $30 from the experiments. 
Each seller was provided cost schedules for market A sales. 4 For market B each 
seller had color-coded tables that gave marginal cost (pink) ,  average cost (green) ,  and 
total cost (yellow) of combinations of volume and scale of plant on 1 1  by 1 4  sheets of 
paper. These tables are in the Appendix. Scale of plant could take 24 values, labeled A 
through Y. 
Two practice periods were conducted. The parameters were the same as those that 
were used in the experiment. The mechanics of the experiment were very complex and 
many questions were prompted during these sessions. The answers to all questions were 
given publicly in a form that yielded no information about parameters that was not 
already public. After each period for the first five periods (including the two practice pe­
riods) the accounting of each subject was checked and spot checks were made throughout 
the experiment. 
III. MODELS
Ten different types of models can be applied to the economic environment. Of course 
these models share many basic principles but they also differ in many ways. Some give 
sharp predictions and the others remain vague. Where possible the models will be ap­
plied directly to the environment in a technical, mathematical fashion. Speculations and 
theorizing about which model might be expected to fit the data best are not considered 
to be part of the exercise at this stage of the experimental inquiry. Table 4 contains 
a summary of the predictions for those models for which predictions can be computed. 
The paragraphs below will briefly describe each model listed in the table. 
A note on efficiency may be useful especially for those who are not familiar with 
experimental economics. The measure invented by Plott and Smith (1981) is a direct 
adaptation of consumers' and producers' surpluses. The buyers receive franc redemption 
values from the experimenter that can be modeled as a (derived) demand function. The 
total value of francs redeemed by buyers is like the gross benefits to buyers from the units 
they acquired. Sellers pay francs to the experimenter for units sold. These payments are 
costs. The allocation that maximizes gross benefits minus costs is the most efficient. It 
is the one that maximizes franc earnings of subjects (exhausts all possible gains from 
exchange). Actual franc earnings divided by the maximum possible is the efficiency with 
which the system is operating. 
Under ordinary modes of organization, 100 percent efficiency of operation is thought 
4A rounding error caused a slight discrepancy between these schedules. For example, total cost at 
the contested market equilibria of scale W and volume 31 was 9765 if computed from the average cost 
table and it was 9773 as listed on the total cost schedule, a difference of 4.8 cents. 
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to be unattainable in the downward sloping average cost case. If a single price is charged
and if price is equated to marginal cost then sellers would lose money. This degree of 
inefficiency is thought to be structural in the falling-average cost case. 
Other practical sources of inefficiency exist. Tough bargaining sometimes results in 
failures to trade. Suppliers might choose the "wrong" scale of plant and thereby impose 
more costs on the system than necessary. Suppliers might choose to enter the B market 
and then cancel. The efficiency loss would be due to the opportunity cost of the low cost 
units that such suppliers could have delivered to the A market. Suppliers might choose 
an unnecessarily limiting quantity of x offer to the market B. In the section on models 
the efficiency of the equilibria allocation predicted by each model is listed. The logic of 
each of these models justifies the nature and potential reasons for inefficiencies. 
Natural Monopoly (Classical) 
The classic model is natural monopoly. According to this model, because of the 
existence of economies of scale, competition will lead to the existence of a monopoly. 
All other sellers will participate in market A. This monopoly facing the market demand 
curve will choose the profit maximizing value of variables without regard to the effect 
that this action might have on the actions of other sellers such as their proclivity to enter 
market B .  That is, where P = D(x) is the market demand function and long-run costs 
are C(x, s(x)) the monopolist sets the value of the variables to 
maximize [D(x)x - C(x, s(x))]. 
x 
For the parameters of the experiment the solution is a price of 684, a quantity equal to 
1 7, a scale of plant of size M and a profit of 4841 in francs. These can be read from the 
table. Figure 3 demonstrates the model. For convenience the continuous model, which is 
only an approximation of the underlying parameters, is used in the figure. The accurate 
predictions based on the discrete environment are in Table 5. 
Tacit Collusion 
Collusion models are very numerous depending upon the complexity of the agree­
ment that can be enforced. It is assumed here that collusion would lead to choices of 
variables that are good from the seller's point of view. We presume that the values would 
be something between Cournot and monopoly and that the volume would be similarly 
restricted. 
Cournot Models 
Cournot models are all derived from the same general principles. Each competitor 
evaluates the market as if the quantity offered by the other sellers is a constant and 
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the resulting market price is that determined by the sum of the quantities offered by 
sellers. For insights about the structure of these models, especially in the presence of non 
convexities as in the case with economies of scale, see Novshek (1984)(unpublished). 
Application of the class of models to any real market, especially the ones created for 
these experiments, might be met with three a priori criticisms/qualifications. First, the 
Cournot solutions to the technical problems are generally not unique. Typically both 
symmetric solutions in which all firms act identically and asymmetric solutions, in which 
some firms are larger than others, exist. The symmetric solutions and those asymmetric 
solutions that have been identified and seem plausible have been included in Table 4. 
The second qualification is that the principles that might govern entry into a market are 
not systematically integrated (unless lack of entry is treated as part of an asymmetric 
solution) into the analysis. For this reason, a special treatment of Cournot models under 
a heading called monopolistic competition is included. The third criticism is derived 
from the nature of the market structure itself. Agents in these markets post a price and 
a quantity. There is every reason to assume that the seller with the lowest price will sell 
all units that the seller offers up to the demand function limits. The hypothesis that the 
quantity sold by other sellers remains constant will almost certainly be violated. Thus 
the structure of the decision ·problem might appear to resemble that of the Bertrand 
theory more than Cournot depending upon how the posted quantity is treated in the 
analysis .. 
All of the criticisms/qualifications are derived in part from the fact that the Cournot 
model is incomplete as a theory. It is silent about the nature of the price determination 
process. If sellers (or buyers) are supposed to be involved in price determination then
some sort of explicit coordination device must exist that guides sellers to settle on the 
same price and guides buyers so that sellers share market volume in a Cournot fashion. 
Instead of dealing with all of this complexity, the Cournot model relies only on axioms 
typical of game theoretic representations of markets that assert that only one price exists 
and further asserts that the one price is determined by the law of supply and demand once 
sellers' quantity choices are given. Nevertheless, Cournot models have broad experimental 
support and must be taken seriously in any environment until the data suggest otherwise. 
The Cournot solutions for duopoly and for triopoly are also in Table 4. Notice that 
the price predicted is 609 regardless of the number of firms. Of course firm size must 
decrease as the number.of firms increases .. This means .that the scale of .plant chosen by 
firms must be smaller under triopoly than under duopoly. 
Monopolistic Competition 
The classical model of monopolistic competition is interpreted as a four firm Cournot 
market. Scale of plants are small in the equilibrium and the opportunity cost of 300 
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francs ($1.80) is barely covered by the 350 profit. Entry of another firm would force the 
profits to levels below the opportunity costs. In the table the Cournot equilibrium profits 
for quintopoly, a fifth firm, are less than the 300 francs opportunity cost for entering the 
B market. Again, notice from the table that the price predictions are the same regardless 
of the number of firms. 
In Figure 4 is shown a representative firm in the four firm equilibrium. The back­
ground shows the market demand function. The costs graphs are from the continuous 
approximation of costs given by equation ( 4). 
Contested Markets 
The contestable market literature has motivated researchers to look for two different 
types of phenomena in experimental data. The possible phenomenon are called "models" 
here, but they operate more like statements that characterize the extremes of what one 
might expect in data. Of course those extremes and the relative tendencies toward them 
contain potentially useful information. 
Perfectly Contested Market (Competitive) Equilibrium. This is the case in which 
only one seller exists in the market. The seller produces at a price and output that 
leaves price equal to average cost including opportunity cost. The profits in market A 
and market B would be the same (thereby justifying the use of the term "competitive"). 
As indicated in the table, the price of the single entrant would be 325; volume would 
be 31; scale of plant would be W and the other six sellers would be in market A. The 
relationships are in Figure 3. 
Without side payments such as a subsidy to compensate a firm for losses and a com­
pletely different institutional arrangement, such as marginal cost pricing or the incentive 
compatible equivalent, average cost pricing might be the best that can be expected from 
a consumer's point of view. It is used as a measure for 100 percent efficiency. 
Over-Contested Market Equilibrium. This model postulates that the price and 
quantities sold would be the same as the perfectly contested outcome above. The only 
difference is the number of firms that have decided to enter. Previous experiments have 
defined this model to predict that all of the potential firms enter. Obviously, the plau­
sibility of such phenomena would a priori seem low but this model is included as a 
benchmarker for completeness. The number, (5), is taken to be the maximum that could 
leave market A and still have it behave competitively. 
Unstable ("Bertrand") 
We do not know the equilibrium of the Bertrand model of these experimental markets. 
1 1
Presumably it involves some sort of mixed strategy. In the data this would appear as a 
type of variability in prices. At this point the model is included for completeness and to 
draw attention to the possibility that the data might not exhibit any type of monotone 
convergence property. It is also included to draw attention to the fact that the literature 
contains suggestions about how such variability phenomena might be modeled should it 
be observed. 
Market Collapse (Type 1) 
Entry into the contested market will involve a cost. The possibility of out-of-pocket 
losses also exists. Since there are no mechanisms for coordinating entry, sellers might 
all decide to operate only in the A market. Under such a circumstance the supply in B 
would be zero. The market would have collapsed. Type 1 collapse is the case when no 
firm enters the B market. 
Market Collapse (Type 2) 
The second type of collapse can occur when more than one firm decides to enter 
but all cancel leaving no one to supply the market. This is a type of coordination failure 
which can occur because the decisions to cancel market B offers are made simultaneously. 
IV. RESULTS
The central results are easy to state. The contestable markets model is the most 
accurate of those considered. After a brief review of the data, the discussion turns to 
making clear the strength of this central proposition. Following the main results, the 
remainder of this section is devoted to a discussion of a series of five observations about 
both individual and systems behavior. 
A typical price time series for both markets are shown in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 
contains the time series for market A, and Figure 6 contains the time series for market 
B. Vertical lines separate periods. The measure of time differs in the two figures. In 
market A the measure is seconds. In market B the measure is the number of events (e.g., 
asks, contracts) because the high speed with which events occur in clock time make them 
indistinguishable given the units (seconds) in which clocktime is measured. 
The horizontal lines in the figures show the price predictors for various models. The 
top line is the monopoly price. The second line is the price predicted by all Cournot and 
monopolistic competition models. The bottom line is the "competitive" price predicted 
by the contestable-market model. Contracts are indicated by circles in both the A market 
and the B market; and in market B the prices posted by sellers are displayed by small 
triangles. Cancellations in the B markets are not shown but in most cases all sellers in 
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the B market canceled except the seller with the lowest posted price. 
Figure 7 contains the price and volume data pooled across all experiments. Each dot 
represents a period in one of the three experiments. The market demand function and 
the predictions of selected models are also shown in the figure. 
The visual impressions are that prices converged to the competitive equilibrium in 
market A and that prices converged to the one predicted by the contestable-market model 
in market B.  These visual impressions are essentially correct. The first results reported 
in this section make the nature of the data that support these impressions precise. 
The first result is a traditional statement intended to prevent any misconceptions 
about what is being reported. Sometimes experimental data are predicted by models 
in an accurate statistical sense. However, in most cases none of the models are statisti­
cally accurate. The first result makes clear that these models contain unanticipated and 
unexplained errors and thereby sets the stage for all subsequent analysis. 
Result 1. All models can be rejected as a statistically accurate representation of the 
data. 
Support. All models are static equilibrium models. However, the data for the B 
markets such as the one contained in Figure 6 exhibits an obvious type of convergence 
pattern which is not captured by any of the models even if a random error term is added. 
In the absence of additional theory appended to the models to take care of the dynamics, 
the models are rejected. D 
The second result is perhaps the central result of the paper. It states that the con­
testable market theory is the one best supported by the data. 
Result 2. After the first six periods all relevant economic variables (prices, volumes, 
profits, scale of plant choices, and efficiencies) are closer to the predictions of the two 
contestable market models than to the predictions of any other model. 
Support. Each of the variables will be discussed in order. All models predict 
competitive behavior in the A markets. The competitive price is 700 and the volume is 
21. In 49 of the 57 periods of all experiments the average price of the period was within
10 francs ( 6 cents for sellers and . 75 of a cent for buyers) of the competitive equilibrium. 
In 56 of these periods the volume was within 3 units of the 21 predicted and in 41 periods 
the volume was exactly 21 units. The relevant data are in Table 5. Since the price and 
volume in the A markets behaved substantially as predicted by all models, the relevant 
comparisons are all in the B markets. 
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In the B markets prices and volumes tended to be closer to the contestable market 
models than any of the others. In 52 of the 57 periods, prices were within 10  francs of 
the price predicted by the contestable-market models (325). In no period was the price 
within 1 0  francs of the price predicted by the natural monopoly model (680), and in 
no period was the price within 10 francs of the price predicted by any Cournot model 
(609). The count comes directly from the data in Table 5 and the predictions in Table 4. 
Similarly the volume was within three units of the contestable market prediction (31) in 
4 7 of the 57 periods. It was never that close to the prediction of the natural monopoly 
model ( 1 7), and it was within three units of the predictions of the Cournot models (20) 
only in two periods. Price and market volume figures support the contestable-market 
model over the others. 
Volume of individual firms further support the contestability model over the Cournot 
models and the monopolistic competition models which, because of symmetry assump­
tions, predict that all B market entrants will have the same volume. In 54 of the 57 
periods only one firm had positive sales in the B market. Thus, in 54 of 57 periods 
the data support contestability over monopolistic competition. In none of these three 
periods in which more than one firm made B market sales, was the distribution volumes 
near equality as predicted by the symmetric game models. As will be implicit in the 
discussions below, sellers that chose to enter the B market did not limit their quantities 
as required by the Cournot model and as they could have done under the procedures. 
In market B profit levels predicted by competing models are in Table 4. Profits 
should be at or above 300 which is the (nearly) certain profit that can be obtained for 
participation in market A. The listing of actual profits of sellers in market B are in Table 
6B. The "active" firms referenced in the table are those that did not cancel their posted 
offer after they had seen the offers of other sellers. Shown also is the number of sellers 
that entered the B market at the beginning of the period. 
Consider only the last four periods of the experiments after some level of equilibration 
has been achieved. The average profit of the lowest price firm over all three experiments 
is 562. 7 francs per period. The average profit of all entrants is 229.25 francs per period. 
Thus the average profit of sellers who entered market B is closer to the 306 predicted by 
the perfectly contested model than to the prediction of any other model except quintopoly 
which can be rejected since the number of sellers was always less than five. Consideration 
of more periods does not change this conclusion. In fact, the conclusion is only reinforced. 
The average profit earned per period by all entrants in market B, considering period 3 
and later, for the three experiments was 4 francs, 17 francs, and 4 francs, respectively, 
far below that predicted by any model. 
The frequency of scale of plant choices is contained in Table 7. Only three choices 
are at scale levels (D, E, G, and M) predicted by any of the alternative models to the 
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contested market model. The contested market model predicts scale W which is the 
mode of choices of sellers (41 choices out of 146 total). Over 40 percent of all choices 
are within one level of that predicted by the contestable-market model. The small mode 
at scale K is interesting because scale K was the example used in the instructions to 
illustrate the nature of costs. 
Efficiency levels are reported in Table 5. The average efficiency level for the three 
experiments is .91, .91, and .90 which is much closer to the .87 predicted by the over­
contested market model than it is the efficiency predicted by natural monopoly (80%), 
duopoly (76%), triopoly (70%), monopolistic competition (67%), or market collapse 
( 413). On average the perfectly contested model is a better predictor of efficiency than 
any of the noncontested models. 
In all dimensions the two contestable market theories are better predictors than the 
alternative models. If one is forced to choose between the perfectly-contested model and 
the over-contested model the choice will be the former. The average number of entrants 
per period is 2.54 which is closer to the one predicted by the perfectly contested model 
than the five predicted by the over-contested model. D 
The next five observations focus on aspects of strategic behavior and on system be­
havior. The first four of the observations are related to individual behavior and the 
strategies that individuals employ. The fifth observation is a summary property of the 
system as a whole. 
Observation 1 suggests that people bias their choices of prices in favor of those divisible 
by 5 and that individual strategies exhibit a degree of modification to take advantage 
of the underlying bias. For example, knowing about this bias, perhaps even in their 
own behavior, people sometimes reduce their own price by a unit. That is, rather than 
quote a price of 325 an individual might quote 324; or a 330 quotation would be modified 
downward to 329 rather than, say, increased to 331. 
Observation 1. Price choices are asymmetrically distributed downward around num­
bers that end in 0 or 5. 
Support. Actual prices ending in 0 or 5 accounted for a large percentage of choices (71 
out of 148). Of the two, prices ending in 0 were the most common, occurring 51 times. 
Prices in a neighborhood, ±1, around 0 and 5, were also asymmetrically distributed, with 
the two numbers 9 and 4 being preferred to the two numbers 1 and 6 by a margin of 25 
to 14. A hypothesis of equal probability can be rejected at .01 level of confidence. 0 
The second observation suggests that behavior does not reflect the belief that the 
behavior of others is independently random with probabilities represented by the relative 
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frequencies of choices. Table 8 shows the relative frequencies with which price choices were 
made, together with the expected profit that would result from various pricing decisions 
given that the choices of others are drawn with probabilities equal to the frequencies in 
the table. If the system was at a Nash equilibrium, then the expected profit would be 
the same for all price choices. 
Observation 2. Pricing strategies are not Nash responses given the relative frequency 
of prices that was observed. 
Support. Consider the potential ask prices in Table 8. The high prices in the neigh­
borhood of 360 and 385 would yield a profit of 150 percent of the lower prices. D 
The third observation is that scale choices of agents are optimal given actual volumes 
sold by sellers. This is particularly interesting because the scale choices are not optimal 
given the quantities offered for sale by sellers. Recall that sellers entering market B 
chose a scale, a price and a quantity offered. The observation is that the scale choice 
suggests that sellers (correctly) expected to sell the market demand quantity but they 
offered a little more than that expectation in hope that the volume would be (possibly 
accidentally) higher. 
Observation 3. The scale chosen by agents tends to be optimum given the actual 
quantity sold. Actual quantity sold tends to equal induced market demand given the 
quote of price. Quantity offered for sale is greater than actual sales and the scale of plant 
chosen is too small given the quoted quantity. 
Support. Figure 8 shows deviations of actual scale chosen from the theoretical optimum 
scale given the price quoted by the agent. If the seller has the lowest price then the
demand function can be used to determine the quantity that will be sold. The quantity 
to be sold can be used to determine the optimal scale for that quantity. The figure shows 
deviations from this optimum. When 0 indicates the optimum and ±1  indicates one 
letter deviations from the optimum. As can be seen in the figure, the mode of choice is 
the optimum given the price. 
The same calculation can be made using the quantities offered for sale. Figure 9 
shows deviation of scale choice from the optimum given the quantity offered. As can be 
seen, the scale choices tend to be smaller than this calculation of optimum. D 
The next observation is that agents specialize in markets. Some agents are always in 
market A while others have a propensity to enter market B. Table 9 contains for each 
individual of each experiment, the total number of times during the nineteen periods of 
the experiment, the number of times the individual entered the B market. For example, 
the person with identification number 7 in experiment 061191 entered the B market 14 
16 
times out of the nineteen periods while person 8 of that experiment never entered. 
Observation 4. The frequency with which market B is entered is not the same across 
sellers. 
Support. Test the hypothesis that the decisions made by the two individuals with the 
lowest propensity to enter, were independently drawn from the same distributor as the 
decisions of the two people with the highest propensity. The hypothesis is rejected at the 
.001 level of significance. D 
The final Observation 5 concerns the behavior of the whole market system. As was 
noted in Result 2, efficiencies are not at 100% as they should be if both the competitive 
model and the perfectly contested market were working perfectly to predict behavior. 
On average, excluding the period ones, the system of both markets is operating at an 
efficiency level of about 91.3%. While this is much better than the 80% predicted by 
the natural monopoly model or the 41 % predicted by the market collapse model, these 
two models suggest sources of inefficiency that can be interpreted as the social cost of 
regulation. If more than one firm happens to enter the market there is an opportunity
cost of profits foregone in market A. On the other hand, if there is under entry (no firm 
enters and sells) and efficiency loss will exist due to the loss of consumer surplus in market 
B.  The observation is that the efficiency loss from these two sources amounts to about 
67% of the 8.7% average loss in system efficiency (not including the first periods). 
Observation 5. Excluding period ones, efficiency loss due to over entry is about 
2.53% and efficiency loss due to under entry is about 3.28% 
Support. If exactly one firm leaves market A and enters market B the system can
operate at 100% efficiency. This maximum possible efficiency expressed as a function of 
the number of entrants, n is: maximum possible efficiency= 100 - (.01476)(n - 1) if 
n > 0. However, the maximum possible efficiency is .41 if n = 0. Thus, (.01476)(n - 1) 
is the efficiency loss due to over entry and .59 is the efficiency loss due to no entry (or 
under entry). Of course, both over entry and under entry can occur at the same time if 
several firms enter and all cancel their asks and thus sell nothing. 
The number of firms that leave market A with an intent to enter market B each period 
of each experiment is contained in Table 5. Application of the formula to the numbers 
in the table produces for all experiments and for all periods (except the period ones), an 
average loss of .0253 due to over entry. The table also shows three periods, one in each 
experiment, in which no units were sold in market B due to no entry either by virtue of 
leaving market A and canceling (two periods) or by not leaving market A (one period). 
The efficiency loss averaged over all periods except the period ones, is 0.0328. D 
17 
If the efficiency losses identified in Observation 5 are interpreted as the cost of market 
regulation then the overall average efficiency loss of 8. 7% can be decomposed into an 
implicit regulatory cost of 5.8% and "other inefficiencies" of 2.9%. Of course, whether or 
not this is the least expensive regulation possible is not addressed here. The major point 
is to identify the inefficiency and demonstrate that it can be measured. 
Once the "regulatory cost" or "uncoordinated entry cost" is removed, the remaining 
2.9% efficiency loss is of interest. This percentage represents the combined effects of 
typos, wrong scale choices, inefficiencies due to strategic maneuvering, inefficiencies due 
to posted prices above average cost, etc. The fact that the combined effect of all sources 
of inefficiency is small, strongly suggests that, with the exception of uncoordinated entry, 
the perfectly contested market theory is predicting almost perfectly. That is, the cost 
expended on this form of regulation has been almost perfect in achieving its desired effect. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper posed a series of questions. First, will increasing returns result in a single 
seller? Will the single seller charge a monopoly price? If a monopoly price is not charged,
do models exist that accurately predict what the price will be? 
The answer to the first question is yes. For the most part all sales tend to be made 
by a single agent. This is a particularly interesting result since neither monopolistically 
competitive or oligopolitic structures tended to evolve even though they could have. In 
particular, the data provide no support at all for Cournot models of industrial structure 
and pricing. 
The answer to the second question is no. Even though sales were almost always by 
a single seller, monopolistic pricing did not emerge. Instead, the single seller sold at 
prices near those that would prevail if units were supplied at the lowest average cost 
that covered the opportunity cost of the supplying firm. The supplying firm chose to 
operate at a scale of plant and at prices such that consumers paid the lowest possible 
price subject to the constraint that the supplier did not make a loss. Briefly put, the 
system behavior was closer to that described by contestable market theory than any of 
the other models considered. 
In some respects the data here provide strong s11pport for the conclusions drawn from 
other studies that experimentally examined the possibility of contestability theory. One 
could have been concerned that the results of other studies might have been due to sub­
ject boredom, the linearity of costs, the lack of latitude for monopolistically competitive 
organizations, etc. The results of this paper demonstrate that such concern about pre­
vious results are not well founded. The fundamental tendencies reported by others were 
observed after all of the potential explanations were controlled. 
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To the extent that contestable market theory fell short of accurate predictions, the 
nature of the failure of contestability theory is interesting. The tendency to enter the 
"monopolized" market is too great and there is a chance that no one will enter. Firms 
tended to enter the industry in the hope that the incumbent would try to raise prices to 
near monopoly levels. Given the behavior of the incumbent, these firms would have been 
better off participating in alternative economic activity. In a sense, the policing activity 
was the cost of regulating the incumbent. Aside from this monitoring cost the system 
worked substantially as predicted by contestability theory. 
Obviously, there exist many alternative ways to conduct experiments and check the ro­
bustness of the results reported here. Existing theory, especially game theory, is rich with 
suggestions for further experiments (Shapiro, 1989). Theoretically, the timing of deci­
sions could switch market behavior between Bertrand and Cournot. Theories of signaling, 
repeated games and other facets of dynamic rivalry suggest variables and circumstances 
that might have dramatic effects on behavior. The message at this point seems to be 
that future research and experimental designs to explore these many possibilities should 
proceed on the presumption that contestability theory will have considerable exploratory 
power. 
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APPENDIX A 
Tables Giving the Rotation of Market B Incentive Schedules for Demanders 
Experiment: 061191 
Table Al: Rotation of Buyer Schedules 
Buyer ID Number 
Period 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
1 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 
2 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 
3 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
4 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 
5 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl 
6 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 
7 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 
8 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 
9 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 
10 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5, S6 S7 
11 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 
12 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl 
13 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 
14 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 
15 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 
16 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 
17 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
18 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 
19 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl 
Note: For explanation of schedule notation see Table 2. 
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Experiment: 062791 
Table A2: Rotation of Buyer Schedules 
Buyer ID Number 
Period 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
1 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 
2 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 
3 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
4 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 
5 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl 
6 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 
7 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 
s· S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 
9 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 
10 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
11 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 
12 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl 
13 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 
14 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 
15 S6 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 
16 S7 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 
17 S2 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
18 Sl S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 
19 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 Sl 
Note: For explanation of schedule notation see Table 2. 
21 
Experiment: 071991 
Table A3: Rotation of Buyer Schedules 
Buyer ID Number 
Period 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
1 Sl S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
2 S3 Sl S4 S5 S6 S7 S2 
3 S4 S5 S3 Sl S2 S7 S6 
4 S5 S6 S4 S3 Sl S2 S7 
5 S6 S7 S6 S4 S3 Sl S2 
6 S7 S2 S6 S5 S4 S3 Sl 
7 S2 Sl S7 S6 S5 S4 S3 
8 Sl S3 S2 S7 S6 S5 S4 
9 S3 S4 Sl S2 S7 86 85 
10 84 85 83 Sl S2 87 S6 
11 85 86 84 83 81 82 87 
12 86 87 85 84 83 81 82 
13 87 82 86 85 87 83 81 
14 82 81 87 86 85 S4 83 
15 81 83 82 87 86 85 84 
16 S3 84 81 82 87 86 85 
17 S4 85 83 81 82 87 86 
18 S5 86 84 83 81 82 87 
19 86 87 85 84 83 81 82 
Note: For explanation of schedule notation see Table 2. 
22 
APPENDIX B 
Instructions 
GENERAL 
This is an experiment in the economics o f  market decision making. The 
instructions arc simple and if you follow them and make good decisions you 
might earn money which will  be paid to you in cash. 
In this experiment we are going to conduct two m arkets in which some of you 
will be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days or 
trading periods. Attached to the instructions you will  find a sheet l abeled 
Buyer or Seller • .  which describes the value to you of any decisions you might 
make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own
private i n form ation. 
The Currency in this market is francs. Each franc is wonh 
y o u .  
MARKET ORGANIZATION 
There are two markets in this experiment, Market A and Market B .  
dollars to 
1 .  Sellers may only trade in one market per trading period. either Market A o r
Market B.  Before the markets open, Sellers must decide which market to enter. 
2. Buyers arc free to purchase from any seller or sellers in both Market A a n d
Market B. 
Market A is organized as follows. 
Market A is a double auction. 
minutes. You should be familiar with 
computer market. 
Market B is organized as follows. 
The trading period is open for __ 
how bids and asks are placed in the 
Market B is a posted price auction. The trading period is open for __ 
minutes. The sellers place "sealed" asks in the beginning o f  the period. 
Sellers can not change their asks after placing their initial ask. Buyers in 
Market B can not place bids. Buyers can only accept an ask in order to make a 
p u rc h a s e .  
Both Market A and Market B will be open for the same length o f  time. Both 
markets w i l l  open simultaneously. 
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SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO SELLERS 
During each trading period you may only trade in only o n e  o f  the two
markets. You are free io sell to any buyer or buyers as many units as you 
might want in the market you choose. 
Market A and Markel B are di fferent. In Market A. the costs of the units 
depends only on the number of units you sell. In Market B .  your costs are 
determined by both your choice of a schedule of production and the number of 
units you sell . The different schedules of production produce different unit 
costs. If you choose to enter Market B during a trading period, you must 
choose a production schedule and thereby your unit costs. 
Since Market B i s  a posted price auction, sellers will .have o n e 
opportunity to submit an ask. All asks are due at the beginning of the period. 
Market B sellers must therefore decide what production schedule to choose and 
how many units to offer for sale and at what price before the period starts. 
The asks for Market B wil l  be submilled simultaneously so, at the time of 
decision no seller will know the decisions of any other seller. All Market B 
sellers will be instructed to enter their asks in the red order box and press 'F2' 
at the same time. Each seller must place their ask in the row in which they 
have inventory to sell. Sellers can only sell units where they have inventory 
available. The sellers in Market B, after pressing 'F2', will  have one 
opportunity to cancel their asks if they wish to do so. If any seller decides to 
cancel their ask after submitting it, that seller can not enter Market A. Buyers 
will not be able to purchase units from Market B until anyone who wishes to 
cancel has done so. . Similar to the submission of asks. any cancels will be done 
simultaneously. so no other seller will  know the decisions of any other seller. 
Procedure for Sellers: 
I .  Before the market opens. you must decide which market to 
enter, Market A or Market B.  
2 .  After deciding which market to enter, you cross out the 
record area for the other market. 
3 .  If you wish to enter Market B ,  you must 
a) choose a production schedule
b) write your ask (both price and quantity) on your record
sheet in the space provided. 
c) then input your ask (price and quantity) in the red
order box on the computer. 
4 .  When the markets open, all sellers in Market B must p ress 
the 'F2' key at the second when the experimenter indicates. 
5 .  Sellers wishing to cancel their asks will be able to do so 
when the experimenter ind icates. 
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Suppose you choose 10 enter Market A. The first unit that you sell  i n
Market A i n  the indicated trading period, you obtain at a cost o f  the amount 
l isted on the attached record sheets for the first unit. If you sell a second unit 
during the same trading period you incur the additional cost of the second 
unit. The profits from each sale (which are yours to keep) are computed by 
taking the di fference between the price at which you sold the unit and the 
cost of the unit. That is 
Your Unit Profit = Sale Price of Unit - Cost of Unit 
Suppose you choose to enter Market A and sold 2 units. Your selling 
prices were 200 for the first unit and 190 for the second unit. If your cost for 
the first unit was 1 40 and for the second was 1 60, then your profits would be: 
Sellers Market A Prof'jt Cafr11latjon 
Market A Profits 
Profits From First Unit = 
Profits From Second Unit = 
Total Unit Profits = 
200 • 140 
1 90 - 160 
60 + 30 
= 60 
= 3 0  
= 9 0  
Suppose, for example, that you enter Market B .  Your costs in Market B 
are determined by the production schedule you choose before the trading 
period started. For the first unit that you sell, in the indicated trading period, 
you obtain at the cost of the amount listed under the column of your 
production schedule. I f  you sell a second unit during the same trading period 
you incur the cost of the second unit listed under the production schedule you 
have chosen, etc. The profits from the trading period (which are yours to 
keep) are computed by taking the difference between the price at which you 
sold the unit and the cost of  the unit. That is, 
Your Unit Profit = Sale Price o f  Unit - Cost of Unit 
Suppose, for example, you choose a production schedule such that your 
cost for the first unit is 50 and for the second unit it is 75. I f  you sell both 
units at the price of 200 francs, then your profits are: 
Sellers Market B Profit Calculation 
Total Unit Profits 
Profit from· First Unit = 
Profit from Second Unit = 
Total Unit Profit = 
200 - 50 . 
200 - 75 
1 50 + 125 
= 1 50 
= 1 25 
= 275 
The blank s ·· .on 1hc table will . help. you .record .your profits. The sale price 
of the each unit you buy should be recorded at the time of sale. At the end of 
the period, record total of profits on the bottom of the page. Subsequent 
periods should be recorded similarly. 
A total cost sheet and average cost sheet ·have also been included. A 
summary profit sheet has also been provided. After you are famil iar with the 
accounting you may want to use it. 
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SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO BUYERS 
During each trading period you arc free to purchase from any seller or 
sellers as many units as you might want and from any market you might want. 
For the first unit that you buy in either Market A or B, you will receive the 
amount l isted as the first redemption value under unit I for either Market A or 
Market B. I f  you buy a second unit  during the same trading period in the same
market, you wil l  receive the additional amount l i sted as the 2n d  U n i t
Redemption Value, etc. The profits from each purchase (which are yours to 
keep) are computed by taking the di ffe rence between the redemption value 
and purchase price of the unit bought. That is 
Your Profits = Redemption Value - Purchase Price 
Suppose, for example, that you bought two units in Market A and your 
redemption value for the first unit is 200 and for the second is 1 80. In addition, 
suppose in Market B. you purchased two units and your redemption value for 
the first unit of Market B is 140 and for the second is 1 30. If you paid 1 50 for 
the first unit in Market A and 1 60 for the second unit in Market A and you paid 
100 for the first unit in Market B and 90 fo r  the second unit in Market B, then 
your profits arc: 
Buyer Profi I Calculatjon 
Market A Profits 
Profits From First Unit = 200 - 150 = 5 0  
Profits From Second Unit = 1 80 - 160 = 2 0  
Total Unit  Profi ts = 50 + 20 = 7 0  
Market B Profits 
Profits From First Unit = 140 - 1 00 = 40 
Profits From Second Unit = 1 30 - 90 = 40 
Total Unit Profits = 40 + 40 = 8 0  
Total Period Profits
Mrkt A + Mkt B Unit Profits = 70 + 80 = 1 50 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The sale price 
of the each unit you buy should be recorded at the time of sale. At the end of 
the period. record total of profits on the bottom of the page. Subsequent 
periods should be recorded similarly. 
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Special Information to All Sellers 
The following table is an approximation of the market demand function. That is, if the 
price is maintained at some level, the purchasers are able to profitably purchase as many 
units as described by the demand table. The model says nothing as to how this volume may 
be distributed among the sellers. 
Market Quantity 
P rice Demanded 
1 076 or More 0 
1 05 1  t o  1 0 75 1 
1 026 t o  1 050 2 
1 001 t o  1 025 3 
9 76 t o  1 0 00 4 
9 5 1  t o 975 5 
926 to 950 6 
9 0 1  t o  925 7 
876 t o  9 0 0  8 
8 5 1  t o  875 9 
8 2 6  t o  8 5 0  1 0
8 0 1  t o  825 , 1 
776 to 800 1 2
7 5 1  t o  775 1 3
726 to 750 1 4
7 0 1  t o  725 1 5
676 to 700 1 6
6 5 1  t o  675 1 7
626 to 650 1 8
6 0 1  t o  625 1 9
576 to 600 20 
5 5 1  t o  575 2 1  
526 to 550 22 
5 0 1  t o  525 2 3  
476 to 500 24 
4 5 1  t o  475 2 5  
426 to 450 2 6  
4 0 1  t o  425 2 7  
376 to 400 28 
3 5 1  to 375 29 
326 to 350 30 
3 0 1  t o  325 3 1  
2 7 6  to 300 3 2  
2 5 1  t o  275 3 3  
226 to -250 34 
2 0 1  t o  225 3 5  
1 76 
· t o  200 3 6  
, 5 1  t o  1 75 3 7  
1 26 t o  1 50 3 8  
1 0 1  t o  1 25 3 9  
76 to 1 00 4 0  
etc etc 
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SELLERS' PRACTICE COST SHEET 
UNIT COSTS (cost of additional unltl 
Production Schedule Choice ------------> 
J K L 
Total 
Unite 1 4  •. •. - ... .• .• •. •. - 250 3 0 0  320 •. •. 
•. - - •. - .• •. -· •. ... . .. 
Sold 1 5  •. _ _ .• - ... _ ... .• 230 280 300 - - _ _ - - _ .• •. •. •. ... . .. 
1 8  - - - ·- - - -· - - 200 300 250 - ·- - - - - - ·- -· -· - ... . .. 
1 7  -· - - ·- - - - ·- - 200 320 270 - - - -· - - - - -· -· -· ... . .. 
y 
AVERAGE COSTS (co51 per unit sold! 
Production Schedule Choice 
-·-·> 
J K L 
"" 
00 Total --
Units 1 4  - - - - ·- -· ·- ·- - 2 1 4  200 1 88 
Sold " - - - ·- - ·- ·- ... - 2 1 5  205 1 93 
. .  -· - - - - -· - -· - 2 1 4  2 1 1  1 97 
1 1  - - - -· - - - ... - 2 1 5  2 1 8  2 0 1  
v 
CUMULATIVE or TOTAL COSTS 
Production Schedule Choice ·-··········> 
J K L 
-· 
Total 
Unite 1 4 ... - - ... ... ... ,.. ... ... 3000 2100 2100 ... ... ,., ,.. "' ... ... ... ... ... ... ... . .. 
Sold 1 5 - - - ... - ... ... ... - 3230 3010 2100 - ... _ ... _ ... _ _ ... ... ... ... . .. 
1 8 - - - ... ... ... ... ... - 3430 3310 3150 ... ... ... ... ·- ... ·- ... ... ... -· ... . .. 
1 7 -· ..
. 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 3660 3700 3420 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ·- ... ... ... . .. 
v 
Seller 1 . 0.# ___ _ 
Period # Practice Sheet 
Seller - Market A Seller - Market B 
U n it # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0
1 1 
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
2 0  
2 1
2 2  
2 3  
2 4  
2 5  
rxl 
S e l l i n g  
Price 
.· 
Total Unit 
lvl 
U nit 
Cost 
5 0  
1 50 
1 50 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
800 
Profits 
rx1-rv1 
U n it 
P r of i t  Fii the lap section out before 1lte period begins. 
A. Production Schedule � B. Posted Price c. Quantity Offered 6 
D. Posted Price (B) 
E Quantity Sold IS 
F. Revenue (D*E) 
G Total Cost (Cum.Cost ShaaQ 
H. Profit (F·G) D 
:::fil:�•r�i. 
29 
U nit # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3
1 4  
1 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
2 0  
2 1
2 2  
2 3  
2 4  
2 5  
Seller l .D.# ___ _ 
Period # 
Sel ler - Market A 
Ix! ru1 lxl-'u1 
Sel l ing U n i t  U n it 
P rice Cost P r ofit  
5 5 0  
5 5 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
7 0 0  
;fJlt,�fltl{�1 
Total Unit Profits 
Seller - Market B 
Fill the !Dp · section out before 1he period begins. 
A. Production Schedule § B. Posted Pricec. Quantity Offered
D.. Posted Price (B) 
E Quantity Sold
F. Revenue (D.E) 
G Total Cost (Cum.Cost Sheet) 
H Profit (F·G) D 
3 0  
UNIT COSTS <cost of additional unit> 
PERIOD I 
Production Schedule Choice ........................ > 
A B c D E F D H I J K L M N 0 p Q R s T u y w x y 
Tolol 1 585 587 590 596 603 6 1 3  624 638 653 6 7 1  690 7 1 2  735 761 788 8 1 8  849 883 9 1 8  956 995 1037 1080 1 1 26 1 1  73 
Units 2 557 555 556 558 563 569 578 588 601 6 1 5  632 650 6 7 1  693 7 1 8  744 773 803 836 870 907 945 986 1 028 1073 
Sold 3 533 528 526 525 527 530 536 543 553 564 578 593 6 1 1  630 652 675 701 728 758 789 823 658 896 935 9 7 7  
4 5 1 3  506 500 497 495 496 498 503 509 5 1 8  528 541 555 572 590 6 1 1  633 658 684 7 1 3  743 776 8 1 0 847 885 
I s 498 488 479 473 468 466 465 467 470 476 483 493 504 5 1 8  533 551 570 592 6 1 5  641 668 698 72 9  763 798 
I • 488 474 463 453 446 440 437 435 436 438 443 449 458 468 48 1 495 5 1 2  530 551 573 598 624 653 683 7 1 6  
I 1 482 465 451 438 428 4 1 9  413 408 406 405 407 4 1 0  4 1 6  423 433 444 458 473 491 510 532 555 58 1 608 638 
I • 480 461 443 428 4 1 4  403 393 386 380 377 375 376 378 383 389 398 408 421 435 452 470 491  51 3 538 564 
v • 483 461 440 422 405 391 378 368 359 353 348 346 345 347 350 356 363 373 384 398 413 431 450 472 495 
1 0 491 465 442 420 401 383 368 354 343 333 326 320 3 1 7  3 1 5  3 1 6  3 1 8  323 329 338 348 361 375 39 2  4 1 0  431 
1 1  503 474 448 423 401 380 362 345 331 3 1 8  308 299 293 288 286 285 287 290 296 303 3 1 3  324 338 353 37 1 
1 2 5 1 9  488 458 431  405 382 360 341 323 308 294 283 273 266 260 257 255 256 258 263 269 278 288 30 1 3 1 5  
1 3 540 506 473 443 4 1 4  388 363 341 320 302 285 271 258 248 239 233 228 226 225 227 230 236 243 • 253 264
. . 566 528 493 459 428 398 371 345 322 300 281 263 248 234 223 213 206 200 1 9 7  1 9 5  1 96 198 203 209 2 1 8 
1 5  596 555 5 1 7  480 446 413 383 354 328 303 281 260 242 225 2 1 1 198 188 1 79 1 73 168 1 66 165 1 6 7  1 70 1 76 
I I  630 587 545 506 468 433 399 368 338 3 1 1  285 262 240 221 203 188 1 74 1 6 3  1 53 146 1 40 1 3 7  1 3 5  136 138 
1 7 669 623 578 536 495 457 420 386 353 323 294 268 243 221 200 182 1 65 1 5 1  1 38 1 28 1 1 9 1 1 3  1 0 8  1 06 1 0 5  
1 8  7 1 3  663 6 1 6  570 527 485 446 408 373 339 308 278 251 225 202 180 1 6 1  143 1 28 1 1 4 103 93 86 80 77 
w 1 9 761 708 658 609 563 518 476 435 397 360 326 293 263 234 208 1 83 1 6 1  1 40 1 22 1 05 9 1  78 68 59 53 p 
2 0  8 1 3  758 704 653 603 556 510 467 425 386 348 3 1 3  279 248 2 1 8  1 9 1  165 1 4 2  1 20 1 0 1  83 68 5 4  43 33 
2 1 870 8 1 2  755 . 701 648 598 549 503 458 4 1 6  375 337 300 266 233 203 1 14 1 4 8  123 1 0 1  80 62 4 5  3 1  1 8  
2 2 932 870 8 1 1  753 698 644 593 543 496 450 407 365 326 288 253 2 1 9  1 8 8  1 58 1 3 1  105 82 60 4 1 23 8 
23 998 933 8 7 1  8 1 0  752 695 641 588 538 489 443 398 356 3 1 5  277 240 206 1 73 1 43 1 1 4 88 63 4 1 20 2 
2 4  1068 1001 935 872 8 1 0  751 693 638 584 533 483 436 390 347 305 266 228 1 93 159 1 28 9 8  7 1  4 5  22 0 
2 5  1 1 43 1073 1004 938 873 8 1 1  750 692 635 581 528 478 429 383 338 296 255 2 1 7  1 80 1 46 1 1 3  83 54 2 8  3 
26 1223 1 1 49 1078: 1008 941 875 8 1 2  750 691 633 578 524 473 423 376 330 287 245 206 1 68 1 33 9 9  6 8 38 1 1
2 1  1307 1230 1 1 56 1083 1013 944 878 8 1 3  751 690 632 575 521 468 4 1 8  369 323 278 236 1 95 1 57 120 86 5 3  2 3  
2 8  1395 1316 1238 1 163 1089 1 0 1 8  948 881 8 1 5  752 690 631 573 5 1 8  464 4 1 3  363 3 1 6  270 227 1 85 1 46 108 73 39 
2 9  1488 1406 1325 1247 1 1 70 1096 1023 953 884 8 1 8  753 691 630 572 5 1 5  4 6 1  408 358 309 263 2 1 8  1 76 1 3 5  9 7  60 
3 0  1 586 1 500 141 7 1 335 1256 1 1 78 1 1 03 1029 958 888 821 755 692 630 571  513 458 404 353 303 256 2 1 0  1 6 7  1 25 86 
3 1  1688 1 599 1513 ' 1428 1346 1265 1 1 87 1 1 10 1036 963 893 824 758 693 631 570 5 1 2  455 401 348 298 249 203 1 58 1 1 6  
3 2  1794 1 703 1 6 1 3  1526 1440 1357 1275 1 1 96 1 1 18 1043 969 898 828 761 695 632 570 5 1 1  453 398 344 293 2 4 3  1 9 6  1 50 
3 3  1905 1 8 1 1  1 7 1 8  1628 1 539 1453 1368 1286 1205 1 1 27 1050 976 903 833 764 698 633 571 510 452 395 3 4 1  288 238 1 89 
34 2021 1923 1828 1 734 1643 1 553 1466 1380 1 297 1 2 1 5  1 1 36 1058 983 909 838 768 701 635 572 5 1 0  451 393 338 284 233 
3 5  2141  2040 1942 1845 1 751 1658 1 568 1479 1393 1308 1226 1 145 1067 990 9 1 6  843 773 704 638 573 5 1 1 450 392 335 2 8 1  
3 6  2265 2162 2060 1961 1863 1 768 1874 1 583 1493 1406 1320 1237 1 1 55 1076 998 923 849 778 708 641 575 5 1 2  450 3 9 1  333 
3 7  2394 2288 2183 2081 1980 1 882 1 785 1691 1 598 1508 1 4 1 9  1333 1 2'48 1 166 1085 1007 930 856 783 7 1 3 644 578 5 1 3  4 5 1  390 
31 2528 2418 231 1  2205 2102 2000 1901 1803 1 708 1 6 1 4  1 523 1433 1346 1260 1 1 77 1095 1 0 1 6  938 863 789 7 1 8 648 581 5 1 5  452 
•• 2666 2553 2443 2334 2228 2123 2021 1920 1822 1 725 1631 1538 1448 1 359 1273 1 1 88 1 1 06 1025 947 870 796 723 653 584 5 1 8  
4 0  2608 2693 2579 2468 2358 2251 2145 2042 1940 1841 1 743 1648 1554 1463 1373 1 286 1 200 1 1 1 7  1035 956 878 803 729 658 588 
Producllon Schedule Choice -·-> 
A B c D E F ci H 
Totel 1 585 587 590 596 603 6 1 3  624 638 
Units 2 571 571 573 577 583 591 601 613 
Sold 3 558 557 557 560 564 571 579 590 
• 547 544 543 544 547 552 559 568 
I s 537 533 530 530 531 535 540 548 
I & 529 523 519 51 7 5 1 7  519 523 529 
I 7 522 515 509 506 504 505 507 512 
I • 517 508 501 491 493 492 493 496 
v • 513 503 494 . 488 483 481 480 482 
1 0 51 1 499 489 481 475 471 469 469 
1 1 510 497 485 476 468 463 459 458 
1 2 5 1 1  496 483 472 463 456 451 448 
1 3  513 497 482 470 459 451 444 440 
1 4 517 499 483 489 457 '47 439 433 
1 5 522 503 485 470 456 445 435 428 
1 6 529 508 489 472 457 444 433 424 w 537 5 1 5  476 459 445 432 422 N 1 7 494 
1 8 547 523 501 481 463 447 433 421 
1 9 558 533 509 488 488 451 435 422 
2 0  571 544 519 496 475 456 439 424 
2 1  585 557 530 506 483 463 444 428 
2 2  601 571 543 51 7 493 471 451 433 
2 3 6 1 8  587 557 530 504 481 459 440 
• •  637 604 573 5'4 5 1 7  492 469 448 
2 5  657 623 590 . 560 531 505 480 458 
2 8  679 643 609 577 547 519 493 469 
2 7  702 665 629 596 564 535 507 482 
2 8  727 688 651 6 1 6  583 552 523 496 
2 9  753 713 674 638 603 571 540 5 1 2  
3 0  781 739 699 661 625 591 559 529 
3 1  810 767 725 686 648 6 1 3  579 548 
3 2  841 796 753 7 1 2  673 636 601 568 
3 3  873 827 782 740 699 661 624 590 
3 4  907 859 8 1 3  769 727 687 649 6 1 3  
3 5  942 893 845 800 756 715 675 638 
3 6  979 928 879 832 787 744 703 664 
3 7  1017 965 9 1 4  866 8 1 9  775 732 692 
3 8  1057 1003 951 901 853 807 763 721 
3 9  1098 1043 989 938 888 841 795 752 
4 0  1 1 41 1084 1029 978 925 876 829 784 
AVERAGE COSTS (cost per unit sold) 
I J K L M N 0 p 0 A 
653 671  690 7 1 2  735 761 788 8 1 8  849 883 
627 643 661 681 703 727 753 781 8 1 1  843 
602 6 1 7  633 652 672 695 7 1 9  746 774 805 
579 592 607 624 643 664 687 7 1 2  739 768 
557 569 582 598 6 1 5  635 856 680 705 733 
537 547 559 573 589 607 627 649 673 699 
518 527 537 550 564 581 599 620 642 667 
501 508 5 1 7  528 541 556 573 592 6 1 3  636 
485 491 498 508 5 1 9  533 548 566 585 607 
471 475 481 489 499 5 1 1  525 541 559 579 
458 461 465 472 480 491 503 5 1 8  534 553 
447 446 451 456 463 472 483 496 5 1 1  528 
437 437 438 442 447 455 464 476 489 505 
429 427 427 429 433 439 447 457 469 483 
422 4 1 9  4 1 7  4 1 8  420 425 431 440 450 463 
4 1 7  4 1 2  409 408 409 4 1 2  4 1 7  424 433 444 
4 1 3  407 402 400 399 401 404 410 4 1 7  427 
4 1 1  403 397 393 391 391 393 397 403 4 1 1  
410 401 393 388 384 383 383 386 390 397 
4 1 1  400 391 384 379 376 375 376 379 384 
4 1 3  401 390 382 375 371 368 368 369 373 
4 1 7  403 391 381 373 367 363 361 361 363 
422 407 393 382 372 365 359 356 354 355 
429 4 1 2  397 384 373 364 357 352 349 348 
437 4 1 9  402 388 375 365 356 350 345 343 
447 427 409 393 379 367 357 349 343 339 
458 437 4 1 7  400 384 371 359 350 342 337 
4 7 1  448 427 408 391 378 363 352 343 336 
485 461 438 4 1 8  399 383 368 356 345 337 
501 475 451 429 409 391 375 361 349 339 
5 1 8  491 465 442 420 401 383 368 354 343 
537 508 481 456 433 4 1 2  393 376 361 348 
557 527 498 472 447 425 404 386 369 355 
579 547 5 1 7  489 463 439 4 1 7  397 379 363 
602 569 537 508 480 455 431 410 390 373 
627 592 559 528 499 472 447 424 403 384 
653 
• 6 1 7  582 550 5 1 9  491 464 440 4 1 7  397 
681 643 607 573 541 51 1 483 457 433 4 1 1  
710 671 633 598 564 533 503 476 450 427 
74 1 700 661 624 589 556 525 '96 469 444 
s T u y w x y 
9 1 8  956 995 1037 1 0 8 0  1 1 26 1 1 73 
877 913 951 991 1033 1 077 1 1 23 
837 872 908 947 987 1 030 1 0 74 
799 832 867 904 943 9 8 4  1 027 
762 794 827 863 900 9 4 0  9 8 1  
727 757 789 823 859 8 9 7  9 3 7  
693 722 752 785 8 1 9  856 894 
661 688 7 1 7  748 7 8 1  8 1 6  853 
630 656 683 71 3 7 4 4  7 7 8  8 1 3  
601 625 651 679 709 7 4 1  775 
573 596 620 647 6 7 5  7 0 6  738 
547 568 591 6 1 6  643 672 703 
522 542 563 587 6 1 2  • 640 669 
499 5 1 7  537 559 583 609 637 
477 494 512 533 555 580 606 
457 472 489 508 529 552 5 7 1  
438 452 467 485 504 526 549 
421 433 447 463 4 8 1  5 0 1  523 
405 4 16 428 443 459 478 4 9 6  
3 9 1  400 4 1 1  424 439 456 4 7 5  
378 386 395 4 0 7  420 436 453 
367 373 381 391 403 4 1 7  433 
357 362 368 3 7 1  3 8 7  400 4 1 4  
349 352 357 364 3 7 3  384 397 
342 344 347 353 360 370 3 8 1  
3 3 7  337 339 343 349 357 367 
333 332 332 335 339 346 354 
331 328 327 328 331 336 343 
330 326 323 323 324 328 333 
331 325 321 3 1 9  3 1 9  3 2 1  325 
333 326 320 3 1 7  3 1 5  3 1 6  3 1 8  
337 328 321 3 1 6  3 1 3  3 1 2  3 1 3  
342 332 323 3 1 7  3 1 2  3 1 0  309 
349 337 327 319 3 1 3  309 307 
357 344 332 323 3 1 5  3 1 0  306 
367 352 339 328 3 1 9  3 1 2  307 
378 362 347 335 324 3 1 6  309 
391 373 357 343 331 321 3 1 3  
405 386 368 353 339 328 3 1 8  
4 2 1  400 3 8 1  364 349 336 325 
CUMULATIVE or TOTAL COSTS 
Producllon Schedule Choice ..................... > 
A B c D E F 0 H I J K L M N 0 p 0 A s T u v w x v 
Tol•I 1 585 587 590 596 603 613 624 638 653 671 690 712 735 761 788 8 1 8  849 883 9 1 8  956 995 1037 1080 1 1 26 1 1 73 
Unlla 2 1 1 42 1 142 1 1 46 1 1 54 1 1 66 1 1 82 1202 1226 1254 1286 1322 1362 1406 1454 1 506 1 562 1622 1686 1 754 1826 1902 1982 2066 2 1 54 2246
Sold 3 1675 1670 1672 1879 1693 1 7 1 2  1738 1 769 1807 1850 1900 1955 201 7  2084 2158 2237 2323 2414 251 2 26 1 5  2725 2840 2962 3089 3223
4 2188 2176 2 1 72 2 1 78 2188 2208 2238 2272 2316 2368 2428 2496 2572 2656 2748 2848 2956 3072 3196 3328 3468 3616 3772 3936 4 1 08 
I s 2686 2664 2651 2649 2656 2674 2701 2739 2786 2844 29 1 1  2989 3076 3 1 74 3281 3399 3526 3664 381 1  3969 4 1 36 4314 4501 4699 4906
I 6 3174 3138 3114  3102 3102 3 1 1 4  3138 3174 3222 3282 3354 3438 3534 3842 3762 3894 4038 4194 4362 4542 4734 4938 5 1 54 5382 5622 
I 7 3656 3603 3565 3540 3530 3533 3551 3582 3628 3687 3761 3848 3950 4065 4195 4338 4498 4667 4853 5052 5266 5493 5735 5990 6260 
I • 4136 4064 4001 3968 3944 3936 3944 3968 4008 4064 4136 4224 4328 4448 4584 4736 4904 5088 5288 5504 5736 5984 6248 6528 6824 
v • 4 6 1 9  4525 4448 4390 4349 4327 4322 4336 4367 4417 4414 4570 4873 4795 4934 5092 5267 5461 5672 5902 6149 6 4 1 5  6698 7000 7 3 1 9
1 0  5 1 1 0  4990 4890 4810 4750 4710 4690 4690 4710 4750 4810 4890 4990 5 1 1 0  5250 5410 5590 5790 6010 6250 65 10 6790 7090 7 4 1 0  7750
I t 5613 5464 5331 5233 5151 5090 5052 5035 5041 5068 5 1 1 8  5189 5283 5398 5538 5695 5877 6080 6306 6553 6823 7 1 1 4  7428 7763 8 1 2 1
1 2  6132 5952 5796 5664 5556 5472 541 2  5376 5384 5376 54 1 2  5472 5556 5664 5796 5952 6132 6336 6564 6 8 1 6  7092 7392 7 7 1 6  8064 8436
1 3 6672 6458 6269 8107 5970 5860 5775 5717 5684 5678 5697 5743 5814 5912 6035 6185 6360 6562 6789 7043 7322 7628 7959 •83 1 7  8700
1 4  7238 6986 8762 6566 6'98 6258 6146 6062 6006 5978 5978 6006 6062 6146 6258 6398 6566 6762 6986 7238 7 5 1 8  7826 8 1 62 8526 8 9 1 8
1 5  7834 7541 7279 7046 6844 6671 6529 6 4 1 6  6334 6281 6259 6266 6304 6371 6469 6596 8754 6941 7 1 59 7406 7684 7991 8329 8696 9094
1 6 8464 8128 7824 7552 7312 7104 6928 6784 6672 6592 6544 6528 6544 6592 6872 6784 6928 7104 7312 7552 7824 8128 8464 8832 9232 
1 7  9133 8751 8402 8088 7807 7561 7348 7170 7025 6915 6838 6796 8787 6813 6872 6966 7093 7255 7450 7680 7943 8241 8572 8938 9337
(.;.) 1 8  98'6 9414 9018 8858 8334 8046 7794 7578 7398 7254 7146 7074 7038 7038 7074 7 1 46 7254 7398 7578 7794 8046 8334 8658 9 0 1 8  9 4 1 4  (.;.) 10607 10122 9676" 9267 8897 8564 8270 8013 7795 7614 7472 7367 7301 7272 7282 7329 74 1 5  7538 7700 7899 8137 84 12 8726 90771 9  9467 
20 1 1 420 10880 10380 9920 9500 9120 8780 8480 8220 8000 7820 7680 7580 7520 7500 7520 7•80 7680 7820 8000 8220 8480 8780 9 1 20 9500
2 1  12290 1 1692 1 1 1 35 10621 10148 9718 9329 8983 8678 8416 8195 801 7  7880 7786 7733 7723 7754 7828 7943 8 1 0 1  8300 8542 8825 9 1 51 9 5 1 8  
2 2  1 3222 1 2562 1 19•& 1 1 374 10846 10362 9922 9526 9 1 74 8866 8602 8382 8206 807' 7986 7942 7942 7986 8074 8206 8382 8602 8866 9 1 74 9526
23 1 4220 13495 12817 12184 1 1 598 1 1 057 10563 10114 9712 9355 9045 8780 8562 8389 8283 8182 8148 8159 82 1 7  8320 8470 8665 8907 9 1 94 9528
24 1 5288 14496 13752 13056 12408 1 1 808 1 1 256 10752 10296 9888 9528 9'16 9052 8736 8568 8•48 8376 8352 8376 8448 8568 8736 8952 9 2 1 6  9528
25 16431 15569 14756 13994 13281 12619 1 2006 1 1 444 10931 10469 1 0056 9694 9381 9 1 1 9  8906 8744 8631 8569 8556 8594 8681 8 8 1 9  9006 9244 9531
26 1 7654 16718 1 5834 1 5002 14222 1349, 12818 12194 1 1622 1 1 102 10634 10218 9854 9542 9282 9074 891 8  8 8 1 4  8762 8762 8814 89 1 8 9074 9282 9542
27 18961 1 7948 16990 16085 15235 14438 13696 13007 12373 1 1 792 1 1 266 10793 10375 10010 9700 9443 9241 9092 8998 8957 8971 9038 91 60 9335 9565 
2 1  20356 19264 18228 17248 16324 1 5456 14644 13888 1 3 1 88 1 2544 1 1 956 1 1424 10948 10528 10164 9856 9604 9408 9268 9 1 84 9 1 56 9 1 84 9268 9408 9604
2 9  21844 20670 19553 18495 17494 16552 15667 14841 14072 13362 1 2709 1 2 1 1 5  1 1 576 1 1 1 00 10679 10317 10012 9766 9577 9447 9374 9360 9403 9505 9664
30 23430 22170 20970 19830 18750 1 7730 16770 15870 1 5030 14250 13530 1 2870 12270 1 1 730 1 1 250 10830 10470 10170 9930 9750 9630 9570 9570 9630 9750
3 1  251 18 23769 22483 21258 20096 18995 1 7957 16980 16066 15213 1 4423 13694 13028 12423 1 1 881 1 1 400 10982 10625 10331 10098 9928 98:9  9773 9708 9866 
32 26912 25472 24096 22784 21 536 20352 19232 18176 17184 1 6256 1 5392 14592 13856 13184 12576 1 2032 1 1 552 1 1 1 36 10784 10496 10272 1 0 1 1 2  1 0 0 1 6  9984 1 0 0 1 6
3 3  28817 27283 25814 24412 23075 21805 20600 1 9 462 18389 1 7363 16442 1 5568 14759 140 1 7  13340 12730 12185 1 1 707 1 1 294 10948 10667 10453 1 0304 10222 10205
3 4  30838 29206 27642 26146 24718 23358 22066 20842 19686 18598 1 7578 16626 1 5742 14926 1 4 1 78 13498 12886 12342 1 1 866 1 1 458 1 1 1 1 8  10846 1 0642 10506 10438
3 5  32979 31246 29584 27991 26469 25016 23634 22321 21079 19906 18804 1 7771 1 6809 15916 15094 14341 13659 13046 12504 1 2031 1 1 629 1 1 296 1 1034 10841 10719 
36 35244 33408 31644 29952 28332 26784 25308 23904 22572 21312 20124 19008 1 7964 16992 16092 1 5264 14508 13824 13212 12672 1 2204 1 1 808 1 1484 1 1 232 1 1 052
37 37638 35696 33827 32033 30312 28666 27093 25595 24 1 70 22820 21543 20341 19212 18158 1 7 1 77 16271 15438 14680 13995 13385 1 2848 12386 1 1997 1 1 683 1 1 442
38 40166 381 1 4  36138 34238 32414 30666 28994 27398 25878 24434 23066 21774 20558 19418 18354 1 7366 16454 15618 1 4858 1 4 1 74 13566 13034 1 2578 1 2 1 98 1 1 894
3 9  42832 40667 38581 36572 34642 32789 31015 29318 27700 26159 24697 23312 22006 20777 19627 1 8554 17560 16643 1 5805 1 5044 1 4362 1 3757 1 3231 12782 1 24 1 2
4 0  45640 43360 41160 39040 37000 35040 33160 31 360 29640 28000 26440 24960 23560 22240 21000 19840 18760 1 7760 16840 16000 1 5240 1 4560 1 3960 13440 13000
U n it # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0
1 1 
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
B uyer's Practice S h eet Buyer 1.0.#_ 
Period t 
Market A Market B 
x lxl fvl lxl-lvl 
Redemption Purchas Redemption Purchase U n i t  
Value Price P rofit  Unit # Value Price P r o f i t  
550 1 500 
400 2 400 
400 3 300 
200 4 200 
1 00 5 1 00 
0 6 0 
0 7 0 
0 8 0 
0 9 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
0 1 2 0 
0 1 3 0 
0 1 4 0 
0 1 5 0 
Market A - Profits Market B • Profits 
� 
Total Profits 
34 
Tot a l  P ro f i t s  W o r k s h eet 
Name 
I D# 
-------
Period # 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
B 
9 
1 0 
1 1 
1 2
1 3  
1 4  
1 5 
1 6
1 7 
1 B 
1 9  
2 0
2 1
2 2
2 3  
2 4  
2 5  
Total 
Conversion Factor 
Earnings 
P r o f i t
E===iFrancs
,__ _ __.I Dollars 
3 5  
Unit # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
Buyer's Sheet Buyer l.D.# __ 
Period # 
Market A Market B 
rxl lvl fxl-lvl 
Redemption Purchase U n it 
Value P rice P rofit  Unit # Value P rice P rofit  
1 00 0  1 1 08 5  
1 000 2 760 
1 000 3 735 
400 4 4 1 0 
400 5 385 
400 6 6 0  
400 7 3 5  
400 8 0 
400 9 0 
400 1 0 0 
400 1 1 0 
400 1 2 0 
400 1 3 0 
400 1 4 0 
400 1 5  0 
Market A - Profits 
� 
Market B - Profits 
. 
Total Profits 
36 
Unit # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0
1 1 
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
Buyer's Sheet Buyer l.D.# __ 
Period # 
Market A Market B 
lxl lvl [xl-lvl 
Redemption Purchas1 Unit  
Value P rice P rofit  Unit # Value Price Prof i t  
1 000 1 1 060 
1 000 2 785 
1 000 3 7 1 0 
400 4 435 
400 5 360 
400 6 8 5  
400 7 1 0
400 8 0 
400 9 0 
400 1 0 0 
400 1 1 0 
400 1 2 0 
400 1 3 0 
400 . 1 4 0 
400 1 5 0 
Market A - Profits 
r-· 
« 
* 
Market B - Profits 
Total Profits 
3 7  
Total Profits 
38 
Unit # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
Buyer's Sheet Buyer l.D.# __ 
Period # 
Market A Market B 
lxl lvl lx]-lvl 
Redemption PurchasE Unit  
Value P rice Profit  Unit # Value P rice P rof i t  
1 000 1 1 0 1 0
1 000 2 835 
1 00 0  3 660 
400 4 485 
400 5 3 1 0  
400 6 1 35 
400 7 0 
400 8 0 
400 9 0 
400 1 0 0 
400 1 1 0 
400 1 2 0 
400 1 3 0 
400 1 4  0 
400 1 5 0 
Market A • Profits Market B - Profits 
� 
Total Profits 
39 
Unit # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
Market A 
B uyer's Sheet Buyer 1.0.# __ 
Period # 
Market B 
fxl lvl fxHvl 
Redemption Purchas1 Unit 
Value Price P rofit  Unit # Value Price P rof i t  
1 000 
1 000 
1 000 
400 
400 
400 
400 
400 
400 
400 
400 
400 
400 
400 
400 
Market A • Profits 
1 9 8 5  
2 860 
3 635 
4 5 1 0 
5 285 
6 1 60 
7 0 
8 0 
9 0 
1 0 0 
1 1 0 
1 2 0 
1 3 0 
1 4 0 
1 5  0 
Market B - Profits 
Total Profits ! .. ____ _, 
40 
. 
� 
Unit # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4  
1 5
Buyer's Sheet Buyer l.D.# __ 
Period # 
Market A Market B 
lxl lvl fxl-lul 
Redemption Purchase Unit  
Value Price P rofit Unit # Value Price Profit  
1 000 1 9 6 0  
1 000 2 885 
1 000 3 6 1 0
400 4 535 
400 5 260 
400 6 1 85 
400 7 0 
400 8 0 
400 9 0 
400 1 0 0 
400 1 1 0 
400 1 2 0 
400 1 3  0 
400 1 4 0 
400 1 5 0 
Market A • Profits Market B • Profits 
� 
Total Profits 
41 
Unit # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4  
1 5
B uyer's Sheet Buyer 1.0.# __ 
Period # 
Market A Market B 
lxl lvl lxl-lvl 
Redemption Purchase Unit  
Value Price Prof it  Unit # Value Price Prof it  
1 000 1 9 3 5  
1 000 2 9 1 0
1 000 3 585 
400 4 5 6 0  
400 5 2 3 5  
400 6 2 1 0 
400 7 0 
400 8 0 
400 9 0 
400 1 0 0 
400 1 1 0 
400 1 2 0 
400 1 3 0 
400 1 4 0 
400 1 5 0 
Market A - Profits 
rm' 
. 
Market B - Profits 
Total Profits 
4 2  
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Figure 2 
Long Run Average Cost, 
Se lected Short Run Costs 
and Market Demand 
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Figure 3 
Monopo l i st i n  Market B :  A Continous APProximation
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Figure 4 
Quadopol i s t  i n  Market B :  A Continous Approximation
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Figure 5 :  Market A; Price Time Series , Exp . 061191 
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Figure 6 :  Market B ,  Price Time Series , Exp . 061191 , 
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Figure 7: Period Prices and Quantities, all Periods, all Experiments 
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Frequency Figure 8 
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Table 1 :  Individual Incentives - Market A 
Demand Costs 
All Seller Agents 
Agent/ (07 through 13) 
Unit 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 had Same Cost 
1 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 550 
2 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 550 
3 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 700 
4 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
5 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
6 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
7 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
8 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
9 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
10 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
11 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
12 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
13 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
14 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
15 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 700 
52 
Table 2: Demand Redemption Value Schedules Used in Market B 
(Schedules Rotated among Buyers) 
Schedule/ 
Unit S1 S2 S3 S4 Ss s6 S1 
1 960 985 935 1085 1060 1035 1010 
2 885 860 910 760 785 810 835 
3 610 635 585 735 710 685 660 
4 535 510 560 410 435 460 485 
5 260 285 235 385 360 335 310 
6 185 160 210 60 85 llO 135 
7 0 0 0 35 10 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
53 
Table :J 
CUMULATIVE or TOTAL COSTS 
Production Schedule Choice _____ ,. 
A • c D ! f 0 H I J K L II H 0 p 0 R s T u v w x y 
Tolal 1 585 587 510 518 803 8 1 3  824 831 653 871 690 7 1 2  735 781 788 818 849 883 9 1 8  956 995 1037 1080 1 1 26 1 1 73 
Unit• 2 1 142 1 142 1 148 1 154 1 188 1 182 1202 1 228 1254 1 288 1322 1362 1 408 1454 1506 1562 1822 1886 1754 1828 1902 1 982 2066 2 1 54 2246 
Bold 3 1875 1870 1172 1879 1893 1 7 1 2  1731 1789 1107 1150 1800 1955 201 7  2014 2151 2237 2323 241 4 2512 26 1 5  2725 2840 2962 3089 3223 
4 2188 2171 2172 2178 2111 2201 2238 2272 2316 2361 2428 2498 2572 2858 2741 2141 2958 3072 3196 3328 3488 36 16 3772 3936 4 1 0 8  
I s 2888 2684 2651 2841 2858 2874 2701 2739 2718 2144 211 1  2981 3078 3174 3281 3399 3528 3884 3811 3969 4136 4314 4501 4699 4906 
I • 3 1 74 3138 3 1 1 4  . 3102 3102 3 1 1 4  3138 3174 3222 3212 3354 3438 3534 3842 3782 3194 4038 4194 4362 4542 4734 4938 5154 5382 5622 
I 7 3856 3803 3565 3540 3530 3533 3551 3582 3621 3817 3711 3841 3950 4085 4195 4331 4496 4667 4853 5052 5266 5493 5735 5990 6260 
I • 4136 4084 4001 3881 3144 3938 3144 3961 4001 4084 4138 4224 4321 4441 4514 4736 4904 5088 5288 5504 5736 5984 6248 6528 6824 
v • 4611 4525 4441 4310 4341 4327 4322 4338 4367 4417 4484 4570 4873 4795 4934 5092 5267 5461 5672 5902 6149 6415 6698 7000 7 3 1 9  
1 0  5 1 1 0  4990 4890 4110 4750 4710 4890 4690 4710 4750 4110 4890 4990 5 1 1 0  5250 5410 5590 5790 6010 6250 6510 6790 7090 7 4 1 0  7750 
1 1 5613 5484 5331 5233 5151 5010 5052 5035 5041 5068 5 1 1 1  5189 5283 5398 5538 5695 5877 6010 6306 6553 6823 7 1 1 4  7428 7763 8 1 2 1 
1 2 6132 5952 5796 5884 5556 5472 5412 5378 5384 5378 5412 5472 5558 5884 5788 5952 1132 8336 6564 6816 7092 7392 7716 8064 8436 
1 3  6672 6451 6289 1107 5970 5860 5775 571 7 5614 5878 5697 5743 5814 5912 8035 8185 8380 8582 6789 7043 7322 7628 7959 8317 8700 
1 4  7238 8918 6782 8588 8398 6258 6148 6082 6008 5978 5971 8008 8082 8148 8251 6398 6568 8782 6986 7238 7518 7826 8162 8526 8 9 1 8  
1 5 7834 7541 7271 . 7048 8144 6671 6529 6418 6334 6211 6259 6286 6304 8371 8489 8596 8754 8941 7 1 59 7406 7684 7991 8329 8696 9094 
I I  8464 1128 7824 7552 731 2 7104 8928 8784 6872 1592 8544 8521 8544 8592 8872 8784 8928 7104 7312 7552 7824 8 1 28 8464 8832 9232 
1 7  9133 1751 1402 1081 7107 7581 7348 7 1 70 7025 6915 6838 8791 8787 8813 Bin 6968 7093 7255 7450 7680 7943 8241 8572 8938 9337 
1 8 9848 9•14 9018 1858 1334 1041 7794 7571 7391 7254 7148 7074 7031 7031 7074 7148 7254 7398 7578 7794 8046 8334 8658 9018 9414 
1 9  10607 10122 9878 9287 1897 8584 8270 8013 7795 7814 7472 7387 7301 7272 7282 7329 741 5  7538 7700 7899 8137 841 2  8726 9077 9467 
Ln 2 0  1 1 420 10110 10380 9920 9500 9 1 20 1780 8480 8220 1000 7820 7880 7510 7520 7500 7520 7580 7880 7820 8000 8220 8480 8780 9 1 20 9500 "" 2 1 1 2290 1 1692 1 1 135 10821 10148 9718 9329 8883 1871 1418 1195 801 7 7180 7718 7733 7723 7754 7128 7943 8101  8300 8542 8825 9 1 5 1 9 5 1 8  
2 2  13222 1 2582 1 1948 1 1374 10848 1 0382 9922 9528 9 1 74 8868 8802 8382 8208 8074 7188 7942 7942 7986 8074 8208 8382 8602 8866 9 1 74 9526 
2 3  1 4220 1 3495 12117 12184 1 1 598 1 1057 10583 1 0 1 1 4  9 7 1 2  9355 9045 8780 1582 8319 1283 8112 8148 1159 8217 8320 8470 8665 8907 9 1 94 9528 
2 4  1 5288 1 4498 13752 13056 1 2408 1 1108 1 1 2•6 10752 10298 9188 9528 9218 8952 1738 1588 8441 1378 8352 8376 8448 8568 8736 8952 9 2 1 6  9528 
2 5  18431 15569 1 4756 13994 13281 12819 1 2006 1 1 444 10931 10489 1 0058 9894 9381 9 1 1 9  1908 8744 8631 8569 8556 8594 8681 8819 9006 9244 9531 
2 6  17654 16718 1 5834 15002 14222 13494 12818 12194 1 1822 1 1 102 10634 10218 9854 9542 9282 9074 891 8  8814 8762 8762 8814 8918 9074 9282 9542
2 7  18961 1 7941 1 6990 16085 15235 14438 1 3898 1 3007 1 2373 1 1 792 1 1 266 10793 10375 10010 9700 9443 9241 9092 8998 8957 1971 9038 9160 9335 9565 
2 8  20356 1 9284 18228 17248 18324 15456 14844 1 3888 1 3 1 88 1 2544 1 1958 1 1 424 10948 10521 10184 9858 9604 9401 9268 9 1 84 9 1 56 9 1 84 9268 9408 9604 
2 9  2 1 844 20670 1 9553 18495 17494 18552 1 5887 14841 14072 1 3382 1 2709 1 2 1 1 5  1 1578 1 1 100 10879 10317 1 00 1 2  9768 9577 9447 9374 9360 9403 9505 9664 
30 23430 22170 20970 19130 11750 17730 18770 15870 15030 1 4250 1 3530 1 2870 1 2270 1 1 730 1 1 250 10830 10470 1 0 1 70 9930 9750 9630 9570 9570 9630 9750
3 1  251 1 1  23769 22483 21 258 20096 18995 17957 1 6980 18068 15213 1 4423 13894 1 3028 12423 1 1181 1 1 400 10982 10625 10331 1 0098 9928 9819 9773 9788 9866 
3 2  2891 2  25472 24096 22714 21536 20352 19232 1 8 1 76 1 7 1 84 16256 1 5392 14592 1 3856 13184 12578 1 2032 1 1 552 1 1 136 10784 10496 10272 1 0 1 1 2  1 00 1 6  9984 10016 
3 3  28817 27283 25114 24412 23075 21805 20800 19462 1 8389 1 7383 18442 1 5568 14759 14017 13340 1 2730 1 2 1 85 1 1 707 1 1 294 10948 10667 1 0453 10304 1 0222 10205 
3 4  30838 29206 27642 28146 24718 23358 22066 20842 1 9886 1 8598 1 7578 16626 15742 14928 1 4 1 78 13498 1 2888 1 2342 1 1 866 1 1 458 1 1 1 1.e 1 0846 1 0642 10506 10438 
3 9  32979 31246 29584 27991 28469 25016 23634 22321 21079 1 9906 1 8804 17771 1 6809 15918 15094 14341 13659 13046 12504 12031 1 1629 1 1 296 1 1034 10841 1 0 7 1 9  
38 35244 33408 31844 29952 28332 26784 25308 23904 22572 21312 20124 19008 17984 18992 18092 1 5284 14508 1 3824 13212 12672 1 2204 1 1 808 1 1484 1 1 232 1 1 052 
3 7 37638 35896 33827 32033 30312 28666 27093 25595 241 70 22820 21 543 20341 19212 18158 1 7 1 77 18271 15438 1 4680 13995 13385 12848 1 2386 1 1997 1 1 683 1 1 442 
3 8 40166 38114 36138 34238 32414 30686 28994 27398 25878 24434 23086 21774 20558 19418 18354 1 7366 18454 15618 14858 1 4 1 74 13566 13034 1 2578 1 2 1 98 1 1 894 
3 1  42832 40667 38581 36572 34642 32789 31015 29318 27700 28159 24697 233 1 2  22006 20777 19627 1 8554 17560 1 6643 15805 1 5044 1 4362 13757 1 3231 1 2782 1 2 4 1 2  
4 0  45640 43360 41 160 39040 37000 35040 33160 31360 29840 21000 26440 24980 23580 22240 21000 19840 11760 17760 1 6840 16000 15240 1 4560 1 3960 13440 13000 
Table 4: Models and Predictions 
Market B Market A 
Number Per Per Agent Number 
of Scale Market Market Agent Profit of Market Market System 
Model Agents Choice Price Volume Volume (Francs) Agents Price Volume Efficiency 
I .  Natural monopoly 1 M 684 17 17 4841 II 6 700 21  .80 
2. Tacit coll us ion 
3. Cournot (symm) duopoly 2 G,H 609 20 10 1400 II 5 700 21  .76 
4. Cournot (Asym) triopoly 3 609 20 II 4 700 21 .70 
( 1) D,E 6 498 
(2) E 7 670 
Monopolistic competition 
(Sym. Cournot) 
<.n 
<.n 5. Quadopoly 4 C,D 609 20 5 351 3 700 21 .67 
6. Quintopoly 5 c 609 20 4 228 2 700 21 0 
7. Perfectly contested 
(competitive) 1 w 325 31 31 306 II 6 700 21 1.00 
8. Over-contested 5 w 325 31 (31 ,0) (306,0) II 2 700 21  .87 
9. Unstable ( "Bertrand")
10. Market collapse 0 0 0 II 7 300 21 .41 
Table 5: Experimental Results: 
Average Prices, Number of Entrants, Volumes, Efficiencies 
061191 062791 071891 
A B A B A B 
Period p Vol. p Vol. N Elf. p Vol. p Vol. N Elf. p Vol. p Vol. N Elf. 
1 717 22 325 30 5 923 584 25 412 26 3 833 697 21 375 29 4 783 
2 691 21 312 31 3 923 727 20 437 26 5 883 704 21 370 30 5 853 
3 696 19 330 30 2 923 683 21 400 30 2 893 682 21 350 30 2 983 
4 685 21 324 31 2 973 709 21 387 31 4 943 693 21 340 28 3 933 
5 691 21 322 31 3 973 702 21 386 30 3 963 701 21 324 31 3 973 
6 703 21 315 31 4 953 701 23 339 32 1 953 703 21 319 31 2 983 
7 696 21 323 31 2 993 702 21 330 31 4 953 696 21 319 31 2 993 
8 700 21 320 31 2 993 699 23 324 33 3 953 697 21 318 31 3 973 
9 698 21 321 31 1 1003 696 22 - 0 0 403 694 20 330 31 1 983 
10 701 19 400 28 2 933 698 21 330 30 3 963 696 23 325 3 1  2 963 
11 691 21 394 30 3 723 700 21 326 31 3 973 696 21 320 31 3 973 
12 698 21 398 28 3 903 701 21 324 33 4 953 696 21 321 3 1  1 1003 
13 698 21 330 31 3 973 700 21 335 30 2 983 639 21 319 27 2 853 
14 700 21 335 31 2 993 699 22 325 31 3 953 696 2 1  330 31 1 983 
15 702 24 - 0 3 323 700 22 330 31 3 953 697 21 328 31 3 973 
16 700 21 328 32 2 923 700 21 326 31 3 973 695 21 324 33 3 973 
17 700 21 327 31 2 993 700 21 327 31 2 993 700 21 403 19 3 713 
18 700 22 326 31 2 973 700 21 325 31 2 973 697 23 0 3 343 
19 701 21 323 31 2 943 689 19 437 26 1 933 693 21 321 31 2 993 
AV. 698 21 336 29 2.2 913 694 21 356 29 2.7 913 693 21 335 27 2.4 903 
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Table 6A: Market A Profit By Experiment, Period, Individual 
Experiment 061191 Experiment 062791 Experiment 071891 
Individual 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 07 08 09 1 0  11 12 13 07 08 09 10 1 1  12 13 
Period 
1 305 660 -2700 325 300 290 316 213 , 300 
2 250 200 300 267 275 870 369 317 
3 298 250 300 0 267 296 310 300 320 200 301 -86 300 290 314 
4 249 210 299 198 220 344 400 350 300 147 300 308 
5 215 300 196 290 311 0 300 336 300 450 156 310 300 
6 335 350 270 301 300 310 309 293 444 300 212 298 303 
7 290 300 258 304 265 309 330 300 300 300 272 298 253 
8 320 300 298 300 290 300 290 300 299 290 298 300 302 231 
9 300 300 300 298 304 260 293 265 297 275 297 300 280 298 301 298 302 286 200 
en 10 299 300 310 305 300 280 300 300 280 300 300 298 298 210 ..._, 
1 1  310 325 100 283 301 300 300 280 300 298 301 224 
12 300 302 260 300 300 303 325 300 300 298 300 296 306 
13 300 302 260 300 300 300 301 307 300 297 -902 300 300 219 
14 300 300 300 300 300 300 301 304 281 300 298 296 298 300 220 
1 5  302 308 298 350 300 300 300 303 305 298 305 221 
16 302 300 258 303 345 305 -7300 300 302 301 301 298 302 186 
17 301 300 303 301 300 300 300 300 302 303 299 300 300 300 
18 300 305 302 298 300 0 300 300 295 300 288 303 303 226 
19 301 300 301 306 320 201 294 260 290 300 281 298 300 298 300 232 
en 
"' 
Individual 
Period 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Vol. 
0 
0 
31 
31 
0 
22 
0 
31 
31 
0 
0 
31 
0 
0 
07 
Profit Vol. 
0 
0 
-101 
240 
0 
-1 166 
0 
457 
612 
0 
0 
364 
0 
0 
Table 6B: Market B Volume and Profit 
Experiment 061191 
08 09 10 11 12 13 
Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit 
30 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 -194 0 0 0 0 
0 0 30 180 
31 271 0 0 
31 209 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
31 147 
31 178 
28 2016 0 0 
8 -2936 0 0 
28 504 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 32 480 
0 0 
31 333 
31 612 
\,;> 
'° 
Individual 
Period 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
15 
. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
07 
Vol. Profit 
26 1950 
26 2600 
1 -456 
31 2069 
0 0 
32 736 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
31 256 
26 2600 
Table 6B: Market B Volume and Profit . .  cont. 
Experiment 062791 
08 09 10 1 1  12 13 
Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
29 2023 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
30 900 
0 0 
0 0 0 0 31 364 
33 239 
0 0 30 330 
0 0 31 240 
0 0 33 388 0 0 
30 480 
31 209 0 0 
31 364 0 0 
31 333 0 0 
31 364 
0 0 
"' 
0 
Individual 
Period 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
07 
Vol. Profit 
26 988 
3 -1048 
28 1 12 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Table 6B: Market B Volume and Profit .. cont. 
Experiment 071891 
08 09 I 10 11 
Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit 
0 0 3 - 1798 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
31 178 
31 23 
31 1 16 
0 0 
31 302 
31 132 
27 -952 
31 395 
33 487 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 
12 13 
Vol. Profit Vol. Profit 
27 263 
30 870 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 31 85 
31 302 
0 0 
0 0 
31 178 
0 0 
31 302 
0 0 
0 0 
19 185 0 0 
0 0 
31 170 
Table 7: Frequency of Scale of Plant Choice 
in All Three Experiments, All Periods 
Scale Number of Choices 
A 3 
B 0 
c 3 
D 1 Cournot triopoly and more 
E 0 
F 0 
G 1 Cournot duopoly 
H 0 
I 1 
J 1 
K 9 
L 0 
M 1 Monopoly 
N 0 
0 3 
p 1 
Q 0 
R 2 
s 8 
T 7 
u 25 
v 21 
w 41 Contested market 
x 3 
y 15 
61 
Table 8: Relative Frequency of Price Choices
in Periods Beyond the Sixth and Expected Profits of Price Strategy 
Relative Frequency Posted Price Profit if Prob.* of Expected 
Price Range Low Price Choices Strategy Low Price Low Price Profit 
318 ::; p $324 19/91 .21 
325 ::; p $ 329 21/91 .23 I 325 302 .79 238 
330 $ p $ 334 13/91 .14 I 330 457 .56 256 
°' 335 ::; p ::;  339 6/91 .07 I 335 612 .42 257 
"" 
340 $ p $ 344 3/91 .03 I 340 630 .35 220 
345 ::; p ::;  360 6/91 .07 I 345 780 .32 250 
360 ::; p 23/91 .25 I 360 1230 .25 307 385 1980 .25 495 
* computed neglecting ties.
Table 9: Number of Decisions to Enter the B Market 
in All Nineteen Periods: By Individual, By Experiment 
Experiment Individual Identification Number 
7 8 9 10 1 1  12 13 
061191 14 0 4 11 7 10 2 
062791 18 1 14 1 14 2 2 
071891 6 3 8 0 11 2 18 
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